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Jonathan Fineman*
1.

INTRODUCTION

For over one hundred years, the fundamental principle of American
employment law known as the "at-will rule" has remained the same: either
party to an employment contract may terminate the contract at any time
without cause.' The at-will rule is widely reviled by scholars, although it
does have a few defenders . For decades, many academics and practitioners
have sought to abolish the at-will rule and replace it with a system whereby
employees may only be terminated for just-cause.3 Since the 1960s, courts
and legislatures have carved out a number of "exceptions" to the at-will
rule, such as antidiscrimination statutes.4 According to the dominant
narrative in employment law scholarship, the decades of criticism and
exceptions reflect a substantial weakening of the at-will rule.5 Many

* Associate Professor, Florida A&M University College of Law.
1. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (summarizing the English common law and tracing the development
of the at-will doctrine in the United States).
2. Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. CIN. L.
REv. 517, 517, 517 n. 1 (2004) (finding more than 200 articles on employment at-will published
between 1985 and 2003 based on a simple Westlaw search, most critiquing the rule).
3. Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human Capital:Toward a New Foundationfor Employment
Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 126 (2006) ("Almost all scholars who
have proposed reforming employment termination law have advocated replacing the employment
at-will rule with good cause protection or something very similar."); Michael J. Phillips, Toward a
Middle Way in the PolarizedDebate Over Employment At Will, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 441,443 (1992).
4. Libenson, supra note 3, at 127-28.
5. Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment At
Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 9-10 (1993) (summarizing arguments made by other scholars).
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scholars have even predicted that the at-will rule will soon be abolished or
swallowed by its exceptions. 6
In this article, I argue that employment scholars should stop trying to
replace employment at-will with just-cause employment, at least in the
short term. I do not take this position because I agree with supporters of the
at-will rule. Indeed, I agree wholeheartedly with proponents of a just-cause
system. Instead, I make the pragmatic argument that the current focus on
at-will versus just-cause employment is not productive because I disagree
with those scholars who argue that the at-will rule is on its last legs.
Despite decades of criticism, we are nowhere close to replacing
employment at-will with a just-standard. If anything, the at-will rule has
become more entrenched in recent years.'
We should accept that the at-will rule as inevitable in the current
American political and social context. Instead of trying to control
employers' ability to terminate employees, we should try to deal with the
consequences of giving employers such broad control over the workplace.
Primarily focusing on termination ignores many other aspects of the
employment relationship, like wages and how an employee is treated while
at work. Many such aspects of an ongoing employment relationship may be
more important to employees than the unlikely possibility of termination
without cause.
This article applies recent "vulnerability" scholarship to employment
law issues. A vulnerability approach argues that the autonomous liberal
legal subject at the heart of much of political and legal thought fails to
capture the material, social, and developmental realities of the human8
condition and thus should be replaced with a "vulnerable subject.",
Importantly, and in contrast to the autonomous, independent, and selfsufficient abstraction of the liberal legal subject, the vulnerable legal subject
is theorized as embodied and as embedded in social contexts. 9 The idea of
the vulnerable subject has been described as providing a needed
6. See Bird, supra note 2, at 522-23; Donald C. Carroll, At-Will Employment: The Arc of
Justice Bends Towards the Doctrine'sRejection, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 655, 665 (2012); Cornelius J.
Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,

1-2 (1979).
7. Carroll, supra note 6, at 656-57.
8. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
EMORY L.J. 251, 263-66 (2010) [hereinafter The Responsive State]. The theory recognizes that
institutions, including the state, are also vulnerable, although differently so. The Vulnerable
Subject, therefore, can be either an individual or an institution. Id. at 14-15. See Anna Grear,
Vulnerability, Advanced Global Capitalism and Co-symptomatic Injustice: Locating the
Vulnerable Subject, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR

LAW AND POLITICS 41-60 (Martha Fineman & Anna Grear eds. 2013).
9. Id.at 48-52.
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intervention into U.S. policy discussions, providing a "heuristic" - a way to
shift the focus of inquiry to a more balanced or complete conception of
what it means to be human in ways that will raise new questions and reveal
new relationships and patterns.' I plan to apply this general theory to the
employment context by the creation of the constructs of the "vulnerable
employer" and the "vulnerable employee."
As a starting point for applying vulnerability theory to the employment
relationship, this article examines the effect of employment law on
employees' vulnerability and resilience to vulnerability. Importantly, we
must recognize that the at-will rule is the manifestation of a policy choice
made by the state. This policy choice gives a privilege to American
employers that is not shared by employers in most other first-world
nations. " That policy choice, like all others, has consequences. It
decreases employees' resilience and ability to positively respond in the face
of their vulnerability.
A vulnerability approach allows us to introduce the idea that the
privilege the employer enjoys under the at-will regime might also
appropriately be complemented by some reciprocal responsibility for the
situation of the employee. To the extent possible, employment policy
should attempt to mitigate the consequences of giving employers broad
control over the workplace by balancing it with some benefits for
employees. At present, employers receive most of the privileges of the atwill rule, but do not bear a proportionate share of the consequences. Using
vulnerability and resilience as guiding principles, a vulnerability analysis
asks whether those burdens and benefits should be more equitably shared.
In addition, because the at-will rule is a privilege created by the state,
vulnerability theory suggests the state may have some additional obligation
to protect employees' resiliency beyond fashioning employment law.
II.

THE DEBATE OVER EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL

A.

Just Cause Versus Employment At- Will

The "at-will" rule has been the basic foundation of American
employment law since the late Nineteenth Century.' 2 The at-will rule
provides that each party to an employment relationship of indefinite term is
10. Id.at58-60.
11. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A HistoricalReview
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 404-06 (2001-2002); Joseph E. Slater, The
"AmericanRule" that Swallows the Exceptions, II EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53, 104-05 (2007).
12. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 126-27.
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able to unilaterally terminate the employment without notice at any time for
any reason.' 3 It positions the employer and employee as equals within a
bargaining relationship and is couched in terms of freedom of contract and
individual liberty.
Employers and employees can contract around the at-will rule, most14
commonly by agreeing that employees can only be fired for good cause.
Such an agreement can be express or implied-in-fact in many
jurisdictions.' 5
There are also some statutory and common law
''exceptions" to the at-will rule that prevent employers from terminating
employees for certain designated improper reasons, such as discrimination
on the basis of race or sex. 16 Unless an employer chooses to contract
around the at-will rule or falls within one of the specific exceptions, it is
still free to terminate employees for any reason without notice.17
The ability of the employer to terminate the employment relationship at
any time also means that it may unilaterally change the terms of the
relationship for any reason without notice. 18 Under the at-will rule an
employer is allowed to terminate an employee without reason and then
immediately offer that employee another job with different terms.
13. Id at 118. The only state to change the at-will rule by statute is Montana. See Mont.
Code Ann. § 39-2-904 (2011). Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act created a
cause of action for employees who, after a probationary period, were fired without good cause. Id.
However, the Montana statute significantly limits the remedies available to plaintiffs and it has
been argued that employers in Montana are actually better off than their counterparts elsewhere.
Bradley T. Ewing, Charles M. North & Beck A. Taylor, The Employment Effects of a "Good
Cause" DischargeStandardin Montana, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 17, 21 (2005) (discussing
the statute's trade-off between worker protections and limitations on traditional common law
causes of actions and damages); Libenson, supra note 3, at 130-3 1. In fact, Montana employers
supported the statute when it was passed. Libenson, supra note 3, at 130-31.
14. The at-will presumption does not apply to an employment contract for a definite term.
The presumption for contracts of definite term is that good cause is required to terminate the
employment before the term expires. The parties may contract around this presumption and agree
that a contract of definite term may be terminated at-will. However, definite term employment
contracts are rare in the United States. See Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the
Implied Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 346-48 (2008).
15. See id
16. See infra Part II.C (discussing the exceptions to the at-will rule more thoroughly).
17. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About their Rights, and Why Does It
Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 8 (2002); Schwab, supranote 5, at 8.
18. In many states, like California, an employer may unilaterally modify the terms of the
employment relationship even in the rare instance where the terms are memorialized in a written
contract between the parties. According to the Court of Appeals, "with respect to an at-will
employee, the employer can terminate the old contract and make an offer for a unilateral contract
under new terms." Digiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 300, 304 (Ct. App.
1997). As a matter of law, the Digiancinto Court found that "an at-will employee who continues
in the employ of the employer after the employer has given notice of changed terms or conditions
of employment has accepted the changed terms and conditions." Id. at 304-05.
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Therefore, the employer should be able to achieve the same result without
having to go through the formality of terminating and rehiring the
employee. Of course, there may be some specific limitations on the
employer's ability to set the terms and conditions of work provided by
measures such as the requirement of a statutory minimum wage.' 9 Apart
from these specific areas of explicit substantive regulation, however,
employers are positioned by the at-will rule to effectively control all of the
terms and conditions of employment.
The proffered alternative to replace an at-will employment model is
"just-cause" protection. Under a just-cause system, an employer must have
a good reason to take an adverse employment action.20 Although there is no
uniform agreement on the details of a specific just-cause regime, most
supporters agree that an employer would have to have evidence of either
non-trivial employee misconduct or underperformance, or a substantial
economic or other business-related reason to support a termination. 21
Instituting a just-cause system would prevent employers from making
certain types of decisions that are currently allowed under the at-will
regime. Most obviously, employers could not terminate an employee
arbitrarily. Neither could an employer act for a non-business-related
reason; for example, replacing a competent employee because of nepotism
or personal dislike. In addition, a just-cause system would likely prohibit
employers from making some merit-based or economic decisions that are
not considered sufficiently strong. For example, if an employer wants to
replace an employee who performs her job well with another person who
will do the same job more efficiently, or for less pay, there may be a
question regarding whether that justification is sufficient. There may also
be a question about whether some employee misconduct that does not rise
to the level of insubordination would constitute sufficient justification for a
termination. In addition, a just-cause system may make employers more
reluctant to act even when they believe the decision to be justified, because
the decision will be second-guessed by a court, arbitrator, or other
adjudicative body. Therefore, an employer may not take action against an
employee unless and until the employer is able to gather enough evidence
to support the decision to the adjudicator, which may slow or even prevent
some decisions altogether. 2
19. See infra Part II.D (discussing the major areas of legislation in more detail).
20. Libenson, supra note 3, at 113.
21. E.g., id. (summarizing the positions ofjust-cause supporters).
22. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 28; John P. Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory
Control of Termination Decisions: A Case for the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal
Requirements, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 560-61 (1997).
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Defenses of the At- Will Rule

Hundreds of books and law review articles have been devoted to the atwill employment rule.23 While the overwhelming majority of scholars
criticize the at-will rule, there are a vocal minority who defend it. 24 Perhaps
the single most well-known defense of the at-will rule is the 1984 article by
Richard Epstein entitled "In Defense of the Contract At Will. '25 Professor
26
Epstein argues "the importance of freedom of contract is an end in itself.,
Employees are perceived as individuals competent enough to understand
and enter contracts of their own free will, and thus it is argued that they
should be free to enter into at-will employment relationships on equivalent
terms with the employer. Consistent with the abstract ideal of freedom of
contract, Professor Epstein argues that a hypothetical typical employee will
"choose" to be employed at-will because they want the reciprocal "benefits"
of that arrangement, especially the ability to terminate the employment
relationship at any time.27 Therefore, he asserts that the prevalence of
employment at-will reflects what would be the voluntary complementary
choices of both employer and employee.28
Professor Epstein also describes what he sees as the objective benefits
of employment at-will over the alternative of a just-cause rule. 29 He argues
that the at-will rule is necessary to provide employers with the ability to
motivate workers and make sure they are productive. In other words, the
threat of termination prevents employees from taking advantage of
employers.3
Conversely, the ability of employees to quit at any time

23. Bird, supra note 2, at 517 & n.1 (2004) (finding more than 200 articles on employment
at-will published between 1985 and 2003 based on a simple Westlaw search).
24. Id. at 522. Defenses of the at-will rule can be found in a number of articles. E.g., Larry
A. Dimatteo, Robert C. Bird, & Jason A. Colquitt, Justice, Employment, and the Psychological
Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 459 (2011); Frantz, supra note 22, at 560-61; Mayer G. Freed &
Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J.
1097, 1098-99 (1989); Jeffrey L. Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at-WillEmployment Contract:
An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 331 (1984); Lary S. Larson, Why
We Should Not Abandon the Presumption That Employment Is Terminal at Will, 23 IDAHO L.
REv. 219, 219 (1986); Ian Maitland, Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argument, 8 J. Bus.
ETHICS 951, 951 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Hege and Employment at Will: A Comment, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 1625, 1626 (1989); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the Employment at Will
Rule, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 881, 881 (1983).
25. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984).
26. Id at 953.
27. Id.at 954-55.
28. Id.at 955-56.
29. See infra Part I.B (the just-cause rule prevents employers from taking adverse
employment actions against employees unless there is good cause to do so).
30. Epstein, supra note 25, at 965.
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prevents employers from taking advantage of employees, who Professor
Epstein assumes would choose to leave if the burdens of employment
outweighed the benefits. 3' In addition, the flexibility of the at-will
employment relationship is advocated because it would allow both parties
to respond to changing conditions and imperfect information.3 2
Professor Epstein asserts that the increased costs and reduced
flexibility of a just-cause rule would "hamper general mobility in labor
markets. 3 3 Specifically, he predicts that employers would be worried
about the possibility of lawsuits and therefore would not be as willing to
hire.3 4 Other scholars have expanded this argument to claim more broadly
that employment at will is the most efficient system. 35 Employers are
posited as being more willing to hire in times of growth and invest in labor
instead of capital improvements because they know they can jettison
employees if it does not work out. 3 6 Furthermore, Epstein believes that
giving employees job security is inefficient because the costs associated
with processing and protecting themselves against claims will take up
resources that could be directed towards the enterprise or given to
employees.3 7
Finally, Professor Epstein argues that market forces will naturally
prevent employers from abusing whatever superior bargaining position they
are argued to have under the at-will rule because if an employer terminates
an employee arbitrarily or for some improper reason, that employer will
have a difficult time retaining and recruiting other employees who might
then perceive the employer as unfair. 3' Failing to explain how such
information will be made available to potential employees, he sees further
restraint in the fact that the employer would also bear the costs of selecting
and training a new employee, a cost which the employer might also evade
unless a replacement is not only necessary, but in need of training.39

31. Id.at 966.
32. Id.at 969 ("The at-will contract is an essential part of [planning for the unknown)
because it allows both sides to take a wait-and-see attitude to their relationship so that new and
more accurate choices can be made on the strength of improved information.").
33. Id. at 972.
34. Id.
35. See Frantz, supra note 22, at 558, 560-61; Freed & Polsby, supra note 24, at 1097-98;
Harrison, supranote 24, at 331.
36. Dimatteo, Bird, & Colquitt, supra note 24, at 459.
37. Posner, supra note 24, at 1633-34.
38. Epstein, supra note 25, at 967-68. This assumes not only perfect information but also
viable options on the part of the subsequent employees.
39. Id.
at 973-74.
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C. Direct Challenges to the At- Will Rule
In recent years, a number of academics have criticized the at-will
rule. 40 In fact, many scholars predict that the at-will rule will be abolished
or "swallowed" by its exceptions in the near future. 4 1 Criticisms of the atwill approach are based on a few different grounds, such as inequality of
power 42, fairness to employees 43, human rights or ethics", and social
consequences.4 5 Many critics also disagree with the efficiency arguments
raised by Professor Epstein and others, arguing that costs to employers from
a just-cause system are outweighed by increases in productivity provided by
job security.46
Critics of the at-will rule focus on the potential for employers to take
advantage of employees who are typically in a less favorable position when
it comes to making choices about employment.47 The modern workplace
allows for greater abuse by the employer than was present in the past.
Employees are now more dependent on employers and less likely to be able
to effectively bargain because of a decline in union density.48 Critics of the
at-will rule often note that the United States is one of the very few
industrialized countries that lacks some form of just-cause standard for
40. Bird, supra note 2, at 517 & n. 1 (noting that over 200 scholarly articles critical of the atwill rule have been published between 1985 and 2004).
41. Bird, supra note 2, at 522-23; Carroll, supra note 6, at 655; Peck, supra note 6, at 1-2;
Schwab, supra note 5, at 9-10 (summarizing arguments made by other scholars).
42. E.g. Andre D. Bouffard, Emerging ProtectionAgainst Retaliatory Discharge:A Public
Policy Exception to the Employment At-Will Doctrine in Maine, 38 ME. L. REV. 67, 70 (1986)
("In the last two decades, however, courts and commentators have recognized that, because the

mutuality of obligations rationale is based on the false premise of relatively equal bargaining
power between employees at-will and employers, the traditional employment at-will doctrine has
little or no legitimate economic justification.").
43.

Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward

Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988) (focusing on harm suffered by unjustly terminated
employees).
44. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 672-83; Phillips, supra note 3, at 456-57; Clyde W.
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV.

481, 506 (1979).
45. See St. Antoine, supra note 43, at 67-68.
46.

See Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L.

REV. 631, 677 (1988).
47. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 132-33. Although either party has equal ability to
terminate the relationship, the consequences of doing so are often imbalanced. Frank J. Cavico,
Employment At Will and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 502 (1992). ("Given the

considerable disparity in economic power and bargaining positions between employers and
employees, particularly large corporate employers, and the employer's chiefly unchecked control
over the terms and conditions of the employment relation, abuses in the treatment of employees
naturally arise.").
48. See Bird, supra note 2, at 520-21.
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employment contracts. 49 The mismatch between the American system and
the rest of the world is sometimes viewed as a human rights issue. 50 It has
been noted that while the rest of the industrialized world establishes a
baseline of fairness to employees, the at-will rule violates some
fundamental "right" of employees to be treated fairly. 5
Significantly, the way criticisms have been structured around the
European alternatives to the at-will rule cast the debate as a binary choice in
which either at-will survives in its current form or it is done away with
completely by statute or by being swallowed by its exceptions. 52 This is
unfortunate. The U.S. does not have a robust employee rights framework
with which to vanquish employment at-will, and such an all or nothing
approach has deterred the development of more "moderate" or pragmatic,
but potentially politically acceptable alternative lines of reform.5 3 Such an
approach could retain an at-will framework, allowing termination without
cause in most instances, but nonetheless urge other forms of protection for
employees; forms that recognize and respond to the nature of their distinct
disadvantages within the contemporary employment relationship. It is not
likely the courts can fashion such an approach at this time, but arguments
focused on legislative responsibility could ultimately prove effective.
D. Direct Challengesto the At- Will Rule Have Not Been Effective
The belief expressed by many scholars that the at-will rule is in the
process of being replaced by a just-cause system through judicial challenges
or legislative action is not borne out in practice. Instead, it appears that the
employment at will doctrine has remained stable if not gotten stronger in
the last few decades. 54 In particular, attempts to substitute a just-cause

49. See Befort, supra note 11, at 404-06; Slater, supra note 11, at 104-05.
50. See Befort, supra note 11, at 407.
51. See id. at 407-08.
52. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment At Will, 58 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 8-9 (2010) (criticizing the "dichotomy" between at-will and just-cause and advocating a
middle ground based on notice to terminated employees); see generally Phillips, supra note 3.
53. See Bird, supra note 2, at 536-37.
54. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP.

POL'Y J. 143, 145-46 (2009) (describing the trend away from judicial expansion of employee
contract rights); William R. Corbett, The Need for aRevitalized Common Law of the Workplace,
69 BROOK. L. REv. 91, 133 (2003); Libenson, supra note 3, at 130 ("prospects are exceedingly
dim that any state will adopt the kind of good cause standard that at-will's scholarly opponents
want."); Stewart J. Schwab, Predictingthe Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting
Market Forces, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 36 (2001) (predicting that support for a just-cause standard will
weaken because of changes in the workplace).
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standard for the at-will rule through legislation have made little headway,
and there does not appear to be any substantial political will to change the
system. 55 The Model Employment Termination Act has been the primary
effort to institute a just-cause rule, but it has not been adopted by any state
even though it contains limitations on liability, an opt-out provision, and
other provisions intended to make it attractive to employers and the at-will
lobby. 56
A number of commentators have attempted to explain why the muchmaligned at-will rule seems impervious to change.57 Some argue that
legislatures are not likely to enact statutes modifying the at-will rule
because employees are too diverse and unorganized to form a strong lobby,
while organized labor has no incentive to change the at-will rule because
doing so would essentially give all employees one of the main benefits of a
union contract without the need for unions. The argument continues that
because employers have a strong lobbying presence, abolishing the at-will
rule must come from the courts.58 On the other hand, other scholars argue
that courts either are unwilling or unable to break with over one hundred
years of precedent, and therefore any solution must be legislative in
nature.5 9
In fact, considering all factors it seems that the at-will framework for
employment relations has actually gained ground in some areas, with
segments of employees in the US that have historically benefited from a
just-cause system now subject to employment at-will. This is the result of
For example, unions
individual, judicial, and legislative actions.
historically were successful in obtaining collective bargaining agreements
containing just-cause provisions. 60 But union density has been declining
since the 1950S. 61 Public employment is increasingly subsumed within a
privatized model where unionization is rejected in favor of at-will
arrangements.6 2 In the universities, there are attacks on the tenure system.6 3

55. Bird, supra note 2, at 522-24.
56. See Libenson, supra note 3, at 131-33; Slater, supra note 11, at 107-08.
57. See Phillips, supra note 3; Carroll, supra note 6.
58. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUlM. L. REV. 1404, 1433-34 (1967).
59. Summers, supra note 44, at 521.
60. See Blades, supra note 58, at 1410-11.
61. SEE GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (AUG. 31, 2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.

edu/keyworkplace/174/.
62. See generally James 0. Castagnera, Patrick J. Cihon, & Andrew M. Morriss, Public
Employees: Under the Gun in 2002, 18(4) TERMINATION OF EMP'T BULLETIN 1 (2002).

63.

Id.
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Over the past decades the decline in the unionized labor force to less than
17% of all workers has been spurred on by "right-to-work" legislation that
leaves employees free to 64reap union benefits without paying union dues,
further weakening unions.
Significantly, protections for non-unionized employees have also
declined. Even without unions, public employees have historically enjoyed
just-cause protections under civil service rules. For the last few decades,
however, this has been changing based on a reform movement known as
New Public Management that has resulted in a shrinking of civil service
protections.65 In 1953, almost ninety percent of the federal civilian
workforce was covered by the civil service system. 66 Today, fewer than
50% of such employees are covered.67 Reformers continue their attempts to
deregulate more federal employees.68 Inroads have also been made into
state and local civil service systems, where we see an even more dramatic
transformation in public employment civil service protection, especially in

64. Todd Spangler, Union Membership Shrinks to 11.3% of Workers, USA TODAY (Jan. 23,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/01/23/unionavailable at
2013),
membership-2012/1858705/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
65. See Jonathan Fineman, Cronyism, Corruption,and PoliticalIntrigue: A New Approach
for Old Problems in Public Employment Law, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 51 (2013).
66. David E. Lewis, Modern Presidents and the Transformation of the FederalPersonnel
System, 7(4) FORUM 6 (2010).
67. Id. at 11. The weakening of public sector employment protections in the federal
government began with the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which eliminated
the Civil Service Commission and allowed some agencies to fashion their own personnel practices
outside of the civil service system. Lewis, supra note 66; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (indicating
that CSRA merit system principles do not apply to government corporations, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the CIA, the DIA, the NSA,
and any Executive agency or component part whose principle function the President determines is
"the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities"); Sarah T. Zaffina, For
Whom the Bell Tolls: The New Human Resources Management System at the Department of
Homeland Security Sounds the Death Knell for a Uniform Civil Service, 14 FED. CIRC. B. J. 705,
713-18 (2005). The creation of federal Senior Executive Service in 1978 induced senior managers
(GS 16 and higher) to give up civil service protections in exchange for private-style incentives and
greater responsibility. See generally PATRICIA W. INGRAHAM, THE FOUNDATION OF MERIT:
PUBLIC SERVICE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 55-56 (1995). More than 98% of eligible managers

did so. As a result of these reforms, the percentage of public employees who have civil service
protection has declined significantly.
68. For example, in the wake of the tragedy of 9/11, there were arguments that the ability to
respond quickly to terrorist threats might be hampered by cumbersome employee protections. The
Bush administration proposed that the newly-created Transportation Security Agency and
Department of Homeland Security be allowed to operate outside of civil service protections.
Zaffina, supra note 67. However, the statute as ultimately adopted did not exempt these
departments from the civil service laws. If the Bush administration's plans for the Department of
Homeland Security had been implemented, fewer than 30% of federal employees would now be
covered by civil service rules. Lewis, supra note 66, at 12.
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recent years. 69 Some states have substantially increased the number of atwill public employees, while others effectively eliminated just-cause
employment and made all state employees at-will.70
E. Statutory and Common Law Exceptions to the At- Will Rule
The at-will rule has not been the only principle that governs the
employment relationship, which is recognized as one of the most complex
and important relationships in modem society.71
State and federal
legislatures have adopted statutes that limit employers' discretion in some
respects, and the courts have also acted through common law doctrines.72
The primary exceptions to employers' right to terminate or take other
adverse employment actions are anti-discrimination statutes, public policy
claims, and implied-in-fact contract claims.73
69. For the most part, courts have enabled the managerial reform movement in public
employment to proceed. Significantly, the Eighth Circuit allowed a state legislature to unilaterally
alter the public employment contract for its workers by removing just-cause protections. Where
the legislature extinguishes a property interest for a general class of people, rather than an
individual employee, no due process is required. This rule has been followed in other jurisdictions.
See Gattis v. Gravett, 806 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1986); Sally C. Gertz, At-Will Employment:
Origins, Applications, Exceptions and Expansions in Public Service, in AMERICAN PUBLIC
SERVICE: RADICAL REFORM AND THE MERIT SYSTEM 47, 59-60 (James S. Bowman & Jonathan
P. West eds., 2007).
70. Texas was first state to convert a large number of employees to at-will status. In 1985,
the legislature eliminated the Texas Merit Council and let agencies design their own personnel
systems. See James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West, Ending Civil Service Protections in Florida
Government: Experiences in State Agencies, in AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE: RADICAL REFORM

AND THE MERIT SYSTEM 151, 152-53; Jerrell D. Coggburn, At- Will Employment in Government:
Its Impact in the State of Texas, in AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE: RADICAL REFORM AND THE

MERIT SYSTEM 151, 152-53 (James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West eds., 2007); Richard Green,
Robert Forbis, Anne Golden, Stephen L. Nelson, & Jennifer Robinson, On the Ethics of At-Will
Employment in the Public Sector, 8 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 305, 305 (2006); J. Edward Kellough &
Lloyd G. Nigro, DramaticReform in the Public Service: At-Will Employment and the Creationof
a New Public Workforce, 16(3) J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 447 (2010); Terrence S. Welch, A
Primeron Texas PublicEmployment Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 981, 983-88 (2004).
71. Developments like civil service protection for public employees and the ascendancy of
organized labor after the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 meant that "just-cause"
requirements applied to much of the labor force, perhaps setting the stage for reconsideration of
the at-will rule in private employment contexts in the latter half of the century. See Scott A. Moss,
Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of
Employment-at-Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV 295, 361-64 (2005).
72. See Carroll, supra note 6, at 668.
73. In addition to the recognized exceptions to the at-will rule, there are federal statutes
regulating the terms and conditions of employment. The primary statutes set minimum wages,
establish rules for overtime pay, and create standards for workplace safety. See, e.g., the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219; the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29

U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (1970). States also have legislation to deal with issues such as
unemployment and workers' compensation benefits. These statutes do not directly implicate the
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Importantly, however, these exceptions do not displace the at-will rule.
Rather, the exceptions merely identify certain specific, designated unlawful
reasons for termination that allow an employee to bring a wrongful
termination claim. Unless the reason for termination can be shown to fall
74
within one of these delineated exceptions, at-will employment will apply.
Commentators often situate these exceptions as part of a larger trend
towards erosion of the at-will rule. 75 According to this view, for years
courts and legislatures have been busy creating exceptions to the at-will
rule. Many scholars see these combined changes as cumulative evidence
that substantial portions of the judiciary and legislature are willing to
recognize the essential unfairness of the at-will rule.76 Some even believe
that an increasing number of exceptions to the at-will rule is an intermediate
stage in the process of ultimately doing away with the at-will rule
altogether.77
I do not agree that the at-will rule is in imminent danger of being
abolished or swallowed by its exceptions. The established exceptions do
not undermine the at-will rule or suggest any substantial second-guessing
by the judiciary or legislative bodies. Instead, the exceptions are consistent
with the continuation of the at-will rule and reflect the policy justifications
that continue to support it. In support of this argument, this article
examines each major exception separately.

at-will rule because they do not limit employers' ability to take adverse employment actions
against employees.
74. See, e.g., MARK A. ROTHSTE1N ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 594-95 (4th ed. 2009)
(discussing an Arizona statute that establishes four exclusive grounds for a claim for termination
of employment).
75. See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to Just
Cause Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Peck, supra note 6, at 1; St.
Antoine, supra note 43; Summers, supra note 44, at 484.
76. See Moss, supra note 71, at 341 (arguing that the proliferation of exceptions to
employment at-will indicates courts' discomfort with the harsh effects of the at-will rule on
employees).
77. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 6; In the literature, the cumulative effects of both implied
contract and these other innovations are described as modifying or limiting the at-will rule
because although an employer may still terminate an employee for a good or arbitrary reason, it
may not do so for a "bad" reason. "Bad" is defined as a reason prohibited by statute or public
policy. As the number of impermissible reasons grows through additional legislation or
affirmations of public policy concerns, the at-will rule is in a sense eroded. Moss, supra note 71,
at 300-02.
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Antidiscrimination

Federal statutes prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, race,
color, national origin, religion, disability, and age.78 Some states add
additional prohibitions, primarily against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and marital status.79
The right of individuals to bring antidiscrimination claims does not
present substantial challenges to the fundamental nature of the at-will
employment relationship. In fact, in that they concede that the employment
relationship is fundamentally governed by individual employer/employee
decisions and private ordering, allowing only minimal state intervention
when instances of impermissible discrimination can be established to have
occurred. Instead of undermining the notion of freedom in employer
decision making, such exceptions function as a safety valve by removing
from a pure at-will system socially condemned categories of discrimination
against some workers based on certain immutable personal characteristics.
A targeted model based on discrimination starkly differentiates what is
impermissible from what is permissible by designating an exceptional form
of discrimination (and an individual bad actor), positioning them as distinct
from the everyday process of making decisions.
That everyday,
unexceptional process is the at-will regime, which is premised as not only
permitted, but required for the operation of a vibrant employment market.
The discrimination exception reinforces the fundamental nature of the
employment relationship. Impermissible discrimination is posited as
isolated, as an aberration in an otherwise free market in employment.
Intervention is viewed as necessary to correct this distortion in the market
so the market can preserve its integrity, and can be viewed as appropriate
and efficient. The conclusion that the Title VII approach does not
fundamentally disturb the underlying structure or nature of the employment
relationship is supported by the fact that stanch proponents of at-will can,
and do, argue that even this targeted form of discrimination should not be
the basis of regulation. According to some proponents of the at-will rule,
the market will address discrimination because employers who discriminate
will be acting less efficiently than those who do not. 0

78. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V
2011); the Americans with Disabilities Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. V 2011);
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
79. See, e.g. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.870 (2011); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(a)-81(a)

(1958).
80.

See Epstein, supra note 25.
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Public Policy

Most states prevent employers from terminating employees when it
would adversely affect the states' public policies or general laws. 8 1 For
example, in almost all jurisdictions it is unlawful to fire an employee for
Whistleblowing generates an
refusal to perform an unlawful act.
exception to the at-will rule in a majority of states, particularly when it
involves a matter of public concern brought to the attention of authorities.83
Public policy exceptions to the at-will framework reflect attempts to
integrate certain public interest concerns beyond impermissible
discrimination into the employment relationship. These exceptions are very
limited, involving situations such as protection of whistleblowing and
refusal to violate the law.
As with the discrimination exception, it is important to note that the atwill rule does not technically displace the at-will. Rather, public policy
exceptions merely identify certain motivations on the part of the employer
that will give rise to a wrongful discharge claim on the part of the
employee.84 In essence, allowing these claims is seen as providing an
additional incentive to employers not to violate other laws. Public policy in
this regard is not expansive enough to capture the broader societal
implications of the way in which the employment relationship is generally
Like discrimination, the public policy
and historically constructed.
exception deals with individual acts, and does not alter the nature of the
employment relationship itself.
81. Many jurisdictions follow expansive rules broadly prohibiting terminations that violate
important public policies. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980);
Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876
(Ill. 1981).
82. One of the earliest case on this point, in which an employee was fired for refusing to
commit perjury at a legislative hearing, was Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). Moss, supra note 71, at 295 (discussing
variation among states in recognizing public policy and other common-law exceptions to
employment-at-will).
83. There are wide variations among states when it comes to whistle blowing exceptions.
One area of dispute is whether internal whistle blowing situations are covered in the same way as
external cases. If someone has only complained to internal management and not to public
authorities a court may feel this reflects no more than an internal disagreement between the
employee and those decision makers within the company and is not sufficient to be deemed a
wrongful discharge. See House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 A.2d 353, 357-58 (N.J. Super. Ct.
th
App. Div. 1989). But see Belline v. K-Mart Corp. 940 F.2d 184, 187 (7 Cir. 1991). Federal
legislation is found in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2002), 18 U.S.C.A §
1514A (2010), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 287 (1985). Federal employees are further protected under the
Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (1978) and the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5
U.S.C.A §§ 1201-1222 (1989).
84. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at 774.
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Implied-in-Fact Contract

The implied contract exception to the at-will rule is based on general
contract principles. Where the parties' actions suggest that they intended to
enter into a contract, or intended to make certain terms a part of their
contract, the court will enforce those terms as if the parties had expressly
agreed to them.85 Courts originally applied implied contract doctrine to
prevent employer opportunism, whereby employers would receive the
benefits of representing to employees that they followed job protection
policies, but would then terminate an employee in violation of those
policies after years of loyal service. 6 In some such situations, courts have
held that an employer's policies and practices, together with the employee's
reasonable expectation that those policies would be followed, constituted an
enforceable implied contract.87
Like the other exceptions, implied contract claims are not a significant
challenge to the dominance of the at-will rule for both practical and
structural reasons. As a practical matter, employers learned how to
immunize themselves against liability for these claims. Courts began
enforcing implied-in-fact employment contracts in the late 1970s and early
1980S.88 After the first few cases were decided, there was an immediate
reaction on the part of employers who did not want their voluntary policies
to become enforceable contracts. 89 Employers began restructuring their
employment documents, policies and practices to avoid liability. 90 Through
a process of trial and error, employers eventually were able to find a way to
significantly reduce their chances of liability. 9' With careful drafting of
85. Implied in fact employment contracts are not recognized in all jurisdictions.
86. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981). The prevalent
theory is that a unilateral contract is formed when an employer issues statements limiting its
prerogatives, such as the application of the at-will rule, and the employee subsequently begins or
continues work. The language must be clear enough so that an employee can reasonably believe
that he or she has been offered employment under its terms and the offer must be disseminated to
the employee. There is no further consideration required, and hence no mutuality of obligation is
required. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at 749, 751.
87. An implied contract can arise from, among other sources: oral representations, terms in
manuals and handbooks, the past practices of the employer or the mandates of the type of
employment, including custom in the trade or industry. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 74, at 764.
88. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., ProfessionalConstruction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 51-52 (1992).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 66-68, 79-80. The authors hypothesize that personnel and legal professionals
overstated the threat of implied contract liability to create a market for their own services. Id at
73-74. In reality, the threat of liability was low. Even in the employee-friendly State of California,
employees prevailed in only 15% of the reported implied contract decisions from 1980 to 1989.
Id. at 58-59, Table 1.
91. Fineman, supra note 14, at 365-66, 368-69.
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personnel documents, employers today have little fear of implied contract
lawsuits. 92 As a result, many employees are arguably now worse off than
they were in the 1970s because employers now do not advertise, or perhaps
even formulate, protective policies for fear of liability. Not only are
implied contract claims now nearly impossible to win, most employees no
longer have the benefit of formal job protections that employers abandoned
to avoid potential liability.
Structurally, implied contract claims work within the logic of the atwill rule, rather than against it. An employer may impliedly enter into an
agreement to limit its own ability to terminate employees, but this
conception of the relationship implies that the employer had the discretion
not to enter into such an agreement in the first place. As long as the claim
is framed as a matter of employer choice, enforcing the contract does not
conflict with the at-will rule. Employers are still free to refuse to offer job
protections and engage in genuine at-will employment. Implied contract
theory cannot be used to import an extrinsic set of rules into the
employment relationship where the intent of the contract is unambiguous
and the contract has been properly formed. Traditional contract law
enforces the agreement between the parties, even if outsiders might view
that agreement as unfair.
4.

Is the Whole Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?

As the brief description of accepted exceptions shows, there seems to
be no clearly developed unifying principles justifying deviation from the
dominant at-will frame for US employment law.93 In fact, as a result of this
rather haphazard patchwork of exceptions, there is little but uncertainty for
both employers and employees.
Employers are dissatisfied because even though they technically have
broad power to terminate employees without cause, employees potentially
have a wide range of claims they can threaten to bring in the event of
termination. Even where those claims might be meritless, employers may
feel pressure to settle in order to avoid the expenses and uncertainty of

92. Employers who wish to avoid liability for implied contract claims take a two-pronged
approach. First, in personnel documents they refrain from promising any sort of job security and
include prominent disclaimers that employment is at-will. This is in marked contrast to a typical
employee handbook from forty years ago. Second, employers require employees to sign a
contract acknowledging that employment is at-will before they begin work. Id at 372-77.
93. Befort, supra note 11, at 396 ("[O]ne cannot extrapolate a unifying principle from the
spate of new regulations emerging in the past fifty years . . . What we have is not one or two
bedrock principles, but a number of competing, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory
themes.").
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defending a threatened suit in court.94 Some employers may choose not to
terminate genuinely unproductive employees unless and until there is
strong, documented evidence suggesting good cause to do so.
On the other hand, fear of liability does not seem to deter other
employers from terminating employees arbitrarily or even in clear violation
of the law. Terminated employees and their attorneys may find it
impossible to conclusively predict when an exception might apply or when
it might be dissolved on appeal in an individual case. 95
Given their unpredictable, seemingly arbitrary nature, it is no surprise
that neither employers nor employees particularly like the current
patchwork of exceptions or the way they operate in practice.9 6 As
articulated by Professor Joseph E. Slater, "the best description of the at-will
rule today is that it embodies the worst of both worlds, with exceptions so
numerous and unclear as to frustrate employers but too small and narrow to
97
protect employees in the vast majority of circumstances.,
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DEBATE
As the preceding section illustrates, the arguments about the at-will
rule and its implications for balancing the interests of employers and
employees are not constructive in their current form. What few changes
have been made in the application of the rule are arbitrary and substantively
inconsistent.
Dealing with discreet issues through the crafting of
exceptions, as important as they may be, has not led to fashioning a
comprehensive and coherent approach to the existing inequality of power
inherent in the modem employment relationship. The resulting patchwork
of exceptions offers limited protections for only some workers in a
haphazard system that pleases neither employers nor academic critics of the
at-will rule. On the other hand, the grand aspiration of a European-style
just-cause standard seems unrealistic.
Moreover, it may be that obtaining a just-cause rule is not as important
as other issues that have more of an impact on employees' lives. It might
be more productive to focus on the consequences of employment at-will
and consider how to mediate them rather than trying to eliminate
employment at-will. In adjusting our focus in this way, it would be helpful

94. Id.at 402-03.
95. Libenson, supra note 3, at 112-13.
96. Id at 112-13 ("American employment termination law is a mess, and neither employees
nor employers get what they need from it.").
97. Slater, supra note 11, at 98.
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to have a theoretical framework with which to organize possibilities beyond
an objection to employment at-will.
A.

Focusing on the At- Will Rule is Too Limiting

Many critics of employment law focus narrowly on the at-will rule and
its exceptions. This has meant that too much of current debates address
only a limited aspect of the over-all employment relationship - that of
"adverse employment actions." 98 An adverse employment action is
typically defined as failure to hire or promote or a demotion or termination.
When considering an adverse employment action, the question is whether a
particular employer action is "improper" because it violates one of the
exceptions to the at-will rule. 99 An adverse employment action is typically
defined as failure to hire or promote or a demotion or termination. 100 The
question currently is whether the adverse employment action violates one of
the specific prohibitions that are recognized as exceptions to the at-will rule.
If it does not, the employer's decision stands; if does, then the employee has
The potential remedies available if the suit 10is2
a cause of action. 01
successful include reinstatement, damages, and possible injunctive relief.
Such remedies will remain elusive for most employees, however, given the
uncertainty of successful challenges under current law.
However, within an existing employment relationship, the typical
employee can do little to address the terms and conditions of employment
or challenge employer decisions that do not qualify as an adverse
As discussed above, one consequence of the
employment action.
employer's ability to terminate an employee at-will and for any reason is
that the employer effectively control all other aspects of the employment
relationship. 10 3 If the employee doesn't like the way the relationship is
structured, they are free to leave.
In addition, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that for some
employees the provision of remedies for unlawful termination is far less
important than other employment-related issues. This is particularly true in
regard to an employee's preserving or establishing the ability to move in
98. A notable exception is recent scholarship by Rachel Arnow-Richman. In a 2010 article,
she argues that the focus on just case as an alternative to the at-will rule is too limiting because it
only provides remedies for employees who can prove they were terminated without cause,
affording too little protection for employees. Arnow-Richman, supra note 52, at 6-7.
99. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760-66 (1998).

100. See id.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
Edelman, supra note 88,at 58-60.
See infra Part 11.
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response to either an adverse employment action or the presentation of a
new employment opportunity. 1°4 In other words, employees are concerned
with many other aspects of the employment relationship beyond termination
and significant changes in employment status. For example, employees are
typically concerned with work environment and training and advancement
possibilities.'0 5 Scholars such as Katherine Stone have argued that for some
employees networking opportunities, skill development, and resume
building are more important than retaining their positions. 10 6 She also notes
that employees today are generally more mobile as a group than employees
have been in the past and that many expect to transfer among employers
over the course of their work lives. 10 7 Employment law could require or
subsidize mobility-enhancing practices on the part of employers. 108 To do
so would provide greater substance and fairness to the idea that employees
and employers are on equal footing when it comes to terminating an
employment relationship.
Significantly, states and the federal government do currently regulate
the workplace beyond adverse employment actions. For example, the Fair
Labor Standards Act requires payment of a minimum wage and overtime
wages, and the Occupational Health and Safety Act requires employers to
follow safety standards. 0 9 However, even these minimal provisions for
regulating the day-to-day conditions under which employees work are
resisted by some employer advocates. Not surprisingly, these provisions
have proven politically difficult to enlarge, change or adapt to modern
circumstances, with employer resistance to promulgating new or updating
existing OSHA standards, as well as resistance to raising the minimum
wage." ° Employer advocates argue that employers must be free from
regulation in order to provide jobs, economic growth, and benefits for the

104. This ability to move to a new employment situation on the part of the employee is
assumed by the at-will rule, which constructs employees and employers as equally flexible actors

within their relationship.

Without a realistic possibility for such mobility, the employee can

hardly be perceived as in an equal bargaining position.
105. See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004).

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. This could be accomplished by on-the-job training, the requirement of post-termination
training, a mandatory notice period before termination, and tax incentives.
109. Fair Labor Standards Act § 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 208 (2006); the Occupational Safety and
Health Act § 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
110. Christina D. Romer, The Business of the Minimum Wage, N.Y. TIMES March 2, 2013, at

BU8.
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whole of society."' Arguments based on pleas for recognition of employee
welfare or need are perceived by opponents of such regulations
as advocacy
12
on behalf of special interests asking for special favors."
B.

The Needfor a Coherent Theory of Employment Law

It is beyond doubt that much has changed in the actual experience of
the employment relationship since the at-will employment rule was
established centuries ago.
Katherine Stone argues that the old
"psychological contract" between employers and employees (loyal service
in exchange for lifetime employment) has been replaced by a culture in
which employees no longer value or respect the same things." 3 Further
transforming the conditions and contexts of employment in the Twenty-first
century have been the decline of unions and the withering away of job
retention security in general, all of which has been accompanied by a rise in
contingent labor. 1 4 Also of contemporary significance are other forms of
changes in the economic and societal contexts in which the employment
relationship is played out. Of particular and increasing importance are
trends in globalization and privatization, as well as rapid and far-reaching
technological changes and alterations in basic societal arrangements, such
as those within the family." 5
In the face of such changes, we need a robust and comprehensive
approach to the employment relationship and employment law. This
approach must be both flexible and context specific enough to
accommodate adjustments as employment changes over time. Without
such a comprehensive theoretical base, today's revisions will inevitably
present yet another set of problems in a few years' time. Society and the
nature of the employment experience will shift in ways that will almost
certainly require further recalibration.
An approach built by focusing on the changing nature and quality of
the employment relationship should also incorporate consideration of the
possible impacts of those changes on society. The workplace influences the
operation and organization of other (symbiotic) societal relationships and
institutions. Essentially, this is an argument that a forward looking,

111. Elizabeth MacDonald, Higher Minimum Wage, Higher Unemployment? Fox BUSINESS
(Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/02/13/higher-minimum-wage-higher
-unemployment/.
112. See id.
113. See STONE, supra note 105.
114. See Befort, supra note 11, at 361-62, 366-70; STONE, supra note 105, at 67-72.
115. See Befort, supra note 11, at 363-66; STONE, supra note 105, at 67-72.
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adaptable reassessment of employment law must also anchor the
employment relationship in larger societal contexts. Employment law
establishes the terms of the relationship between employers and employees,
but its influence does not stop there. Employment law and policy must also
consider how interests well beyond those of the employers and employees
who will be bound by the terms operative in the default employment
contract.
Employment law has significant implications for the functioning and
wellbeing of societal structures and institutions, such as the family. It also
profoundly affects the ability of society to address persistent social
problems, such as poverty. Employment laws and the bargains they detail
affect or influence educational policy, thus the opportunities provided for
They have implications for public health and
the next generation.
wellbeing, particularly as they shape governmental responses in areas such
as the provision of child or health care.
A theory of employment law that is comprehensive and clear about its
objectives will help the United States deal with today's problems and
challenges, as well as the inevitable changes that will surely come in the
future. The theory should address not only the direct employment
objectives to be accomplished, but also the underlying assumptions about
the respective interests, obligations, and capacities of the parties to the
employment relationship and those third parties (including society) affected
by that relationship.
The current state of employment law does not provide a coherent,
uniform framework-quite the opposite. There is no common theoretical
underpinning to the at-will rule and its exceptions. Nor is there an agreed
basis or guiding set of principles for discussing the effects of employment
law on the rest of society. Even within a single exception, such as
antidiscrimination law, there appears to be no coherent, principled reason
why, for example, federal law prohibits discrimination based on gender, but
not sexual orientation.
This lack of theoretical coherence as to social policy objectives extends
beyond the exceptions to the at-will rule to other areas of employment
regulation. For example, the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act were originally enacted in order to stimulate the
economy during the Great Depression, while workers' compensation laws
were established as a way to limit tort claims brought by injured employees
against their employers.1 16 In addition, innovations based on common law

116. Shawn D. Vance, Trying to Give Private Sector Employees a Break: Congress s Efforts
to Amend The FairLabor Standards Act, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LAW J. 311, 312-14 (2002);

2013]

THE VULNERABLE SUBJECT AT WORK

rules, such as implied contract claims and public policy torts, are
inconsistently adopted and sporadically applied in large part because there
has been no coherent agreement as to the justifications for or
appropriateness of such rules.
The theoretical rationale behind legislation such as Social Security
passed early in the 20 th century and justified by the crisis of the Great
Depression has not been significantly reformulated. This is in spite of the
fact that there are significant contemporary political challenges to its
continuation, with critics pointing to changed conditions to support
changing or eliminating the program. Historic compromises may not make
sense to today's politicians because they are inadequate to address the very
different and specific needs of employees and employers (or the state)
today.
In sum, we have a system of rules and exception adopted in response to
a specific historic crisis or as the result of a rare confluence of interests
between the parties to the employment contract and the well-being of
society and the general public. 1 7 Further, given the cumbersome process
for making revisions and the fear of giving up what small gains have been
made, it may be difficult to substantially change such rules once they are
adopted.
C. Shifting Focus to the Effects of Employer Decisions
Instead of continuing to engage in efforts to eliminate the at-will rule, it
might be more fruitful to argue for significant progressive reforms short of
abolition. Such an approach would begin by addressing why it is not only
fair, but also imperative in the twenty-first century that employers assume
some responsibility for the negative consequences their decisions have on
their employees and society.
To achieve this type of more balanced or socially equitable end, we do
not need to completely rethink the employment relationship. Employment
can still be perceived as primarily a "private" or individual contractual
relationship between employer and employee; one recognizing the abstract
liberty of the interests of the respective parties in shaping the relationship to
their mutual advantage. But recognizing this basic conceptual framework
does not mean that parties should also be viewed as equally positioned or
similarly empowered in regard to negotiating an actual employment
relationship. Nor should abstract liberty interests mean that employment
Ellen R. Pierce & Terry Morebead Dworkin, Workers' Compensationand OccupationalDisease:
A Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REv. 649, 653 (1988).
117. See discussion of Great Depression supra Part HLI.B.
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law should impose an unrealistic and forced form of egalitarianism on the
respective positions of the parties, assuming they are operating from exactly
the same vantage points and, face similar or equivalent constraints and
consequences. The law must recognize there are relevant and significant
differences between the positions of and possibilities for employers and
employees in terms of their ability to bargain with each other, but also in
terms of their abilities to successfully respond to such things as economic
dislocations, market fluctuations or distortions, and disruption of "business
as usual."
What has been muted by the debates focusing on the unfairness of atwill employment is the articulation of a well-developed theoretical
argument about the significance of the employer/employee relationship
reflected as also social policy. Employment law establishes the terms that
will ultimately apply to most employment relationships by defining the
nature, extent and consequences of that relationship for both employer and
employee. In this way, the state plays a residual, but vital role in the
shaping of the agreement and subsequent relationship." 8
Employment agreements should be further understood to be forged in
relations of interdependence-the interdependence relevant here is that of
employers and employees upon each other,119 as well as the
interdependence of society and its institutions on a fundamental societal
relationship as employment.
European societies use human rights
principles and conventions to give substance to the interconnectedness of
societal interests with the employer/employee relationship. The United
States has not ratified these approaches, making it imperative to search for
some alternative theoretical framework with which to address the
employment relationship and its implications for society.
IV. THE VULNERABILITY THEsIs
Recent vulnerability scholarship uses the concepts of vulnerability and
resilience to fashion a more equitable and holistic approach to legal and
political thought outside of a human rights paradigm.120 A vulnerability
118. Employment law sets the default or background rules that govern the employment
relationship and also operate as legal context in which actual negotiations will occur.
119. Interestingly, a notion of interdependence is also apparent in the justifications for the atwill rule set out in Section II supra.The employment market will assure efficient operation in that
the actions of both employers and employees will be constrained by its forces. Epstein, supra note

25, at 957, 973.
120. See, e.g., PEADAR KIRBY, VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF
(2006); BRYAN S. TURNER, VULNERABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2006); Nick

GLOBALIZATION

Brooks, Vulnerability, Risk and Adaptation: A Conceptual Framework, TYNDALL CENTRE
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approach argues that the autonomous liberal legal subject at the heart of
much of political and legal thought fails to capture the material, social, and
developmental realities of the human condition. 121 The construct of the
The
"vulnerable subject" is offered as the liberal subject's replacement.
approach looks first at what it means to be human, ultimately focusing on
the ultimate implications of the answer to that question for the construction
responsibility as between the individual and
of society and the conferral 2or
3
institutions.
its
and
state
the
Under the vulnerability theory, both individuals and institutions are
seen as vulnerable, including the institutions representing the state. 2 4 For
purposes of this article, this insight into institutional vulnerability means
that both employees and employers can and should be perceived as
vulnerable, only differently so. 125 Instead of being cast unrealistically as
equals in some contractual relationship, the vulnerability approach would
recognize the differences between employee and employer in positioning,
context, and possible consequences to determine appropriate employment
policy and regulation.
Importantly and in contrast to the autonomous, independent, and selfsufficient abstraction of the liberal legal subject, the vulnerable legal subject
is theorized as embodied and embedded in social contexts. 126 The
vulnerable legal subject is a universal subject (as is the liberal legal
subject), but it is a dynamic subject that is conceptualized as developing and
existing over the life course and not a static construct like the liberal subject

WORKING PAPER No. 38, Sept. 2003, at 1, 2; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 8, 11 (2008)
[hereinafter The Vulnerable Subject]; Anna Grear, The Vulnerable Living Order: Human Rights
and the Environment in a Criticaland PhilosophicalPerspective, 2(1) J. HUM. RTs. & ENV'T 22,
43, 44 (2011); Peadar Kirby, Vulnerability and Violence: The Impact of Globalization, J. HUM.
RTS. & ENV'T, Mar. 1, 2011, at 86-105; The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 274; Ani B. Satz,
FragmentedLives: DisabilityDiscriminationand the Role of "Environment-Framing",68 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 187 (2011); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A World Fitfor Children Is A World Fit
for Everyone: Ecogenerism, Feminism, and Vulnerability, 46 HouS. L.REV. 817, 853-54 (2009).
121. The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 263-66.
122. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 11-12. The theory recognizes that
institutions, including the state, are also vulnerable, although differently so. The Vulnerable
Subject, therefore, can be either an individual or an institution. Grear, supra note 8, at 41-49.
123. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 8, 12; see generally MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 10 (2004).
124. See The Vulnerable Subject, supranote 120, at 12, 13, 17.
125. Because they are differently positioned in regard to the employment relationship, there
will be differences in the vulnerabilities shaping their realities. In addition, many employers are
actually not human, but artificial creations of law, which is a decidedly different form of
vulnerability from that which underlies human embodiment.
126. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 10, 13.
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that merely captures one moment (likely to be the least acutely vulnerable)
in the life of any real-life embodied individual. 127 This means that as the
subject of policy and politics, the vulnerable subject cannot merely be left
to his autonomy, liberty, and independence, but should be cushioned by a
responsive state.
Because we are embodied beings, humans are universally and
constantly vulnerable to experience dependency and need over our lifetime:
all of us as infants and children and many of us as we age, become ill or are
disabled.2 8 Importantly, while beginning with bodily vulnerability, the
thesis recognizes that a state of "invulnerability," is impossible to
achieve.129 Instead, the goal over the course of an individual's (or
institution's) life is to obtain the assets and resources that will provide for
"resilience," which will allow the individual to address, mitigate, or mediate
vulnerability and also provide the wherewithal to take advantage of
opportunities and exercise options when they present themselves, as a good
education allows us to secure and advance in a career. 30 This shift from the
universality and significance of bodily vulnerability to resilience is
theoretically important since it refocuses the legal and policy lens away
from an exclusive
focus on the individual to also encompass society and its
3
1
institutions.'
It is important that the vulnerable subject is conceptualized as a
dynamic actor, one who is engaged in building resilience through
accumulating assets and resources over a lifetime. She is also constantly
encountering a variety of situations and circumstances that can result in
harms or present risks, but can also be an occasion for the conferral of
benefits or offer positive challenges and opportunities. In this way, the
vulnerable subject's accumulated resources also represent the conferral of
advantages or disadvantages. 32 The ability to successfully respond to

127. Id. at 12
128. The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 267; Martha Albertson Fineman, "Elderly" As
Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 101,
116 (2012) [hereinafter ElderlyAs Vulnerable].
129. The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 269; Elderly As Vulnerable, supra note 128, at
116-17.
130. This discussion on systems addressing vulnerability builds on Peadar Kirby's work. See
KIRBY, supra note 120. In discussing resilience, Kirby builds on earlier definitions that
understood resilience as "enabling units such as individuals, households, communities and nations
to withstand internal and external shocks." Id. at 55 (quoting the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean).
131. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 12, 13.
132. Id. at 12.
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situations and circumstances as they arise is dependent upon the degree of
resilience the vulnerable subject has acquired.' 33
The dynamic and complex nature of the vulnerable subject also
presents a paradox: while all humans are universally and constantly
vulnerable, our individual differences mean we may experience
vulnerability differently. 134 The most recognized differences (and ones
already recognized in the law's response in the employment context) are
found in our embodiment. Human differences are manifested across
differences in age, gender, race, and we also have different abilities or
or biased
capabilities. Employment law has responded to discrimination
35
1
difference.
embodied
of
forms
these
of
some
to
responses
In the employment context, recognizing that some employees
belonging to historically subordinated groups are vulnerable to stereotyping
and animus, the law has fashioned remedies that can be viewed as directed
toward preserving the integrity of the employment relationship as one based
on merit-based employer determinations in a way that upholds the principle
of equal protection of law. 136 In these situations, employer control over the
employment relationship has been limited on the basis of a principle against
unwarranted discrimination.
The strength of the vulnerability analysis for employment, however, is
founded on a second form of difference recognized by the approach - those
differences in individual position and placement within status hierarchies.
These differences are produced by society and its institutions. As noted
earlier, the thesis posits that people are not born resilient, but resilience is
time within social and institutional webs
both produced and dissipated over
37
of interaction and relationships.1
Resilience is a key term or concept to understand in applying the
vulnerability thesis. Resilience is perceived as necessary to both confront
life's challenges and to allow individuals to rise to take advantage of life's
opportunities and enjoyments. 38 The idea that resilience is directly related
to the amount and nature of the accumulated assets or resources an
individual possess highlights the central role of societal organization in
133.
134.
135.

The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 269-70.
The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 10.
See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 206(g) (2006); Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2006); Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (Supp. 2008); Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
136. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2006).
137. The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 269-70.
138. Id.
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addressing human vulnerability. 139 No one is born with resilience. It is
produced in40 society and within webs of interacting relationships and
institutions.
Institutions and relationships can be seen as products of society. Law
establishes the terms of formation and some of the terms of operation, as
well as the legal consequences and implications of fundamentally important
institutions such as the family, the marketplace, risk management or
insurance systems, banking or wealth accumulation arrangements, and rules
governing business operation or incorporation.14 1
Law not only
legitimatizes such entities and associations, it also controls their dissolution
(delegitimization) and may also set standards for significant aspects of their
functioning. 142 This is no less true when it comes to employment law and
its role in shaping the employment relationship.
Vulnerability theorists have set out at least five different asset or
resource conferring systems: physical or material; human; relational;
environmental; and existential. 43 Briefly, the physical includes the material
resources that determine our standard of living and ability to invest or
respond to economic crisis. The human are those assets we gather in terms
of education or training that allow us to accumulate assets as well as
provide for our daily needs. Relational resources are found in the support
and strengths provided by family, friends, and associations such as labor or
political affiliates. Environmental resources place us in a natural and built
environment with implications for well-being in both a present and future
sense. Existential resources are found in religion and esthetics - the beliefs
or sensations that can give life meaning and offer solace and comfort.' 44
The idea of the vulnerable subject has been described as providing a
needed intervention into US policy discussions, providing a heuristic - a
way to shift the focus of inquiry to a more balanced or complete conception
of what it means to be human in ways that will raise new questions and
reveal new relationships and patterns. 45 The idea of a vulnerable subject

139. See id.
140. See id.
141. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 6, 19.
142. Id.
143. Kirby originally set out 4 categories of assets: physical assets, human assets, social
assets, and environmental assets. KIRBY, supra note 120, at 55. Fineman expanded about that
thesis and identified a fifth asset: Existential resources are provided by systems of belief or
aesthetics, such as religion, culture, or art, and perhaps even politics. The Responsive State, supra
note 8, at 271.
144. The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 271.

145.

The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 19-20.
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146
aging, 147
has been used to explore issues concerning the environment,
52
5
15
0
1
49
housing, ' school violence,
human rights,
disability, 148 children,
ethics,' 5 3 and reproduction, 154 among other areas. This article seeks to
articulate the construct of the vulnerable employee and the vulnerable
employer and to use these constructs to fashion a new lens for examining
the employment relationship. Significantly, looking at the employee as a
vulnerable subject in this dynamic way, while considering the construction
of resilience over the course of her lifetime, allows us to make some
interesting observations about vulnerability, resilience, state, and
institutional responsibility.

V.

APPLYING THE VULNERABILITY THESIS TO THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP

There are several significant aspects of a vulnerability analysis that are
useful in considering the power imbalance of the modem employment
relationship. First, the focus is shifted to institutional arrangements and the
individual is thus contextualized. Second, the theory looks not only at
discrimination, but also at the ways in which privilege or advantage can be
conferred through institutional operation and law. 155
In addition,
vulnerability theory asserts that the state is always a residual actor,
particularly in regard to the ways in which it regulates institutions through
law. 156 Consequentially, there should be a state responsibility to see that the

146. See Grear, supranote 120, at 42.
147. Elderly As Vulnerable, supra note 128, at 119.
148. Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,38 WASH. L.
REV. 513, 522 (2008).
149. See Woodhouse, supra note 120, at 854, 861.
150. TURNER, supra note 120, at 25.
151. Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, After the Storm: The Vulnerability and Resilience of
Locally Owned Business, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION

FOR LAW AND POLITICS 95-107 (Martha Fineman & Anna Grear eds. 2013).
152. Benjamin Reiss, Campus Security and the Specter of Mental-Health Profiling, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., (Jan. 30, 2011), available at http://chronicle.com/article/CampusSecuritythe/126075/#comments.
153. See Wendy Rogers, Catriona Mackenzie & Susan Dodds, Why Bioethics Needs a
Concept of Vulnerability, in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FEMINIST APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS

12 (2012).
154. Rachel Ann Fenton, Assisted Reproductive Technology Provision and the Vulnerability
Thesis: From the UK to the Global Market, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW
ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 125-47 (Martha Fineman & Anna Grear eds.

2013).
155. The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 120, at 1.
156. Id. at 7.
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law is equitable and institutions and individuals interact in a just and fair
manner.
The prototypical parties to the employment relationship-the employer
and the employee-should both be viewed as vulnerable.157 Although the
employer and the employee are vulnerable in different ways and to different
degrees and have different needs to be satisfied through the relationship,
they are nevertheless both relying on the relationship, particularly in
economic and financial terms. In certain situations, the interests of
employers and employees may contradict each other. In those cases,
employment law has to balance the interests and needs of the parties to the
relationship and resolve the contradiction in favor of one or the other. This
resolution should be seen as the conferral of a form of "privilege" or
advantage on one party to the employment relationship. It should be
informed by a comprehensive understanding of the interests and positions
of the parties, including the costs of the conferral of privilege to the other
party and the implications of the balance for society's interests.
In recognizing both individual and institutional vulnerabilities, the
theory allows for a comprehensive and inclusive consideration of specific
circumstances and actions in play in the employment context. In addition,
vulnerability theory is flexible enough to adjust to changing circumstances,
which is a considerable advantage in a rapidly changing world. As the
positions of employers and employees alter in the wake of new
technologies, innovations, and opportunities consequences to the
relationship can be reexamined without need for a fundamentally new
theoretical framework.
A.

The Vulnerable Employee

Certainly the at-will rule has serious implications for the well-being
and resilience of the vulnerable employee.
With termination, an
employee's access to and opportunities within employment are cut off and
his or her ability to continue to build the resources necessary for resilience
is impaired.
1.

Harm - Employee Vulnerability Realized

Termination greatly increases the likelihood that the individual will
experience harm and lose future options and opportunities. Termination of

157. The terms "employer" and "employee" refer to the status of those prototypes, not to
specific individuals. Specific employment relationships will vary, but the law assumes a universal
subject when drawing categories.
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employment can lead to unemployment or under-employment in the
future. 158 The disruption of the employment relationship also often results
in eroding or diminishing of other resources an employee has accumulated,
such as savings or investments, further undermining his or her resilience,
and hence, ability to meet challenges going forward. 159 Loss of
employment can also have implications on existing social and esthetic
resources. Just as accumulated financial resources may be consumed when
there is no paycheck forthcoming, family relations and feelings of selfthere can be serious
worth and dignity can be eroded by a termination and
160
unemployed.
the
of
spouses
and
children
on
impacts
Unemployment affects the health of the family and its members, with,
The inability of one generation to
inter-generational implications.
adequately provide for their children in terms of providing education,
childcare, and basic necessities has long-term implications for the
individuals, the family, and the society.
Studies have shown that employees who are fired from their jobs have
an increased likelihood of suffering from depression, substance abuse,
illness, and suicide.16 1 Their families also are often harmed: evidence
shows that spouses also suffer effects similar to those experienced by the
terminated employee. 162 In addition, unemployment is linked to increased
levels of divorce, child abuse, and infant mortality. 163 Unemployment also
For every 1% increase in
contributes to poverty and crime. 164
158. See Lee Dye, Unemployment: UCLA Study Shows Stigma of Joblessness Is Immediate,
ABC NEWS (April 6, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/unemployment-stigma-begins-

quickly-makes-job-search-harder/storyid=13302693) (reporting that researchers at the University
of California, Los Angeles, have found that the stigma of being unemployed begins the minute the
person walks out the door).
159. This possibility represents the universal aspect of the analysis. Of course individual
experience will depend of individual factors, such as how quickly on is reemployed, the nature of
that employment another economic and social factors.
ASSOCIATION,
PSYCHOLOGICAL
160. AMERICAN
(2014),
UNDEREMPLOYMENT
AND
UNEMPLOYMENT

OF
EFFECTS
PSYCHOLOGICAL
http://www.apa.org/about/gr/issues/

socioeconomic/unemployment.aspx.
161. See Melanie Greenberg, Preserving Mental Health During Unemployment, THE
MINDFUL SELF-EXPRESS BLOG, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.
psychologytoday.com/blog/the-mindful-self-express/20 1110/preserving-mental-health-duringunemployment.
162. See id.
163.

ROBERT MOOMAW,

KENT OLSON, MICHAEL APPLEGATE &

WILLIAM MCLEAN,

ECONOMICS & CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 308 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 8th ed. 2009).
164. See Jeff Grabeier, Higher Crime Rate Linked to Wages and Unemployment, Study Finds,
OHIO STATE RESEARCH NEWS, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/crimwage.htm (last updated
Apr. 4, 2002); Matthew D. Melick, The Relationship Between Crime and Unemployment, 11, THE
PARK PLACE ECONOMIST, 30-32 (Apr. 2003), http://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPEl 1/mattmelick.
pdf.
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unemployment, it is projected that there will be increases of 5.7% in
homicides, 4.1% in suicides,
and 1.9% in heart, liver, and stress-related
65
1
disorders.
and
diseases
Similar to termination, the employer's ability to set the terms and
conditions of work can exacerbate employee vulnerability and resiliency of
employees. 166 The employer has the unilateral ability to set pay, hours, and
benefits. Its control also extends to determining the form and nature of how
the work is characterized and the type of work an employee does. Since
employment is the means whereby most people obtain physical or material
and human resources, if an employer does not provide benefits, or provides
them inadequately, it will be difficult for the employee (and those
dependent on the
employee) to gain/maintain resilience without some
167
additional help.
Obviously, physical conditions can profoundly affect the health and
economic wellbeing of employees if and when they are injured, but beyond
possible physical harm, employer actions may also affect the social and
psychological wellbeing of employees. 168 For example, bullying by a
supervisor or co-worker can have devastating effects on the ability to
adequately perform tasks, perhaps even leading to resignation. 69 Requiring
permission to use the restroom outside of schedule breaks reduces

165. Robert Bird, Employment as a RelationalContract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 162
(2005) (citing John J. Peregoy & Connie T. Schliebner, Long-Term Unemployment: Effects and
Counseling Interventions, 13 INT'L J. ADVANCEMENT COUNSELING 193 (1990)); Connie T.
Schliebner & John J. Peregoy, Unemployment Effects on the Family and Child: Interventions for
Counselors, 72 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 368 (1994); Lea E. Waters & Kathleen A. Moore,
Predicting Self-Esteem During Unemployment: The Effect of Gender, Financial Deprivation,
Alternate Roles, and Social Support, 39 J. EMP. COUNSELING 171 (2002); Thomas Keefe, The
Stress of Unemployment, 29 SOC. WORK 264 (1984); Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socialization and
Development in a Changing Economy: The Effects of ParentalJob and Income Loss on Children,
44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 293, 299 (1989); Philip Harvey, Combating Joblessness: An Analysis of
the Principal Strategies that Have Influenced the Development of American Employment and
Social Welfare Law Duringthe 2 0 'h Century, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 677, 679-80 (2000).
166. See Cavico, supra note 47, at 500-02 (discussing the employers control within the
workplace).
167. For instance, "Walmart... refuses to pay its employees a livable wage or provide any
form of decent healthcare, increasing reliance on government assistance..." Paddy Ryan,
Walmart: America's Real
Welfare
Queen,
DAILY
KOS
(Oct.
10,
2012),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/10/10/1141724/-Walmart-fuels-inequality-epidemic-takingadvantage-of-our-safety-net#.
168. Canadian law imposes an obligation on the employers to maintain not only a physically
safe workplace, but also a psychologically safe work environment. See ISSUE: WORKPLACE,
http://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/Pages/Mentathealthintheworkplace.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2014).
169. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF LAB. & INDUS., WORKPLACE BULLYING AND DISRUPTIVE
BEHAVIOR, 1-2 (Apr. 2011).
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employees to the status of kindergarteners and is affront to their
dignity. 7°The employer also controls the interaction of employees and can
influence workplace culture, which might result in depriving employees of
the opportunity to build positive working relationships. 171 As with the other
categories falling under conditions in the workplace, with only a few
exceptions the employer has the unilateral ability to determine the rules of
the game.
2.

Providing and Preserving Employee Resilience Through Law

There are two ways in which the law has responded to threats to the
employee's resilience: the provision of social welfare benefits and the direct
intervention into the consequences of the employment relationship on the
employer.1 72 In each situation, the law could be characterized as responding
to vulnerability, although at the time the policy outlook behind the actions
were not explicitly couched in terms of resilience.
For example, the Great Depression, with its resulting massive
unemployment, hunger, poverty, and need, led to the creation of the modem
US welfare state, with programs such as Social Security addressing
vulnerability to aging and disability and the corresponding decline in ability
to gain resources essential for resilience. 73 Aid to Families with Dependent
Children responded to the needs of the family when the head of household
or wage earner was unavailable or unable to provide for them. 174 Such
social welfare provisions generally responded to hunger, dispossession, and
other harms related to poverty and resulting lack of resilience.
State response during these times of national crisis also set the stage for
certain direct interventions into and regulation of the employment
relationship. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act perceived the
possibility of the employee being exploited by the employer. 75 In
structuring a concept of employer responsibility for the meeting the needs

170. See David L. Ostendorf, Packing House Bathroom Breaks, IMAGINE 2050 (May, 18,
2011, 8:13 AM), http://imagine2050.newcomm.org/2011/05/18/packinghouse-bathroom-breaksleaving-human-dignity-at-the-plant-gate/.
171. See State of the Global Workplace, GALLUP CONSULTING 1, 1-26 (2011), available at

http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/145535/State-Global-Workplace-2011 .aspx.
172. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (2006).
173. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, BILL OF RIGHTS IN ACTION
http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria- 14-3-a-how-welfare-began-in-the(1998),
united-states.html (providing general background information on the Great Depression, the
creation of national welfare, and the current state of the system).
174. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-615 (2006).
175. See generally Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
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of the employee, the state did not only address temporary situations, but put
permanent protective response mechanisms in place.
There are other instances where the legal system has imposed some
conditions on employers. At various times in our history, the state has
intervened into the employment relationship and acted to ameliorate the
burdens on employees by imposing some costs on employers. One way the
state does this is by redefining rights as between employer and employee.
While it appears that the state has generally given the primary position of
power to employers, at various points in our history it has also recognized
that the social consequences of employer freedom to act required the
imposition of regulation and responsibility on employers.
In those
circumstances, the state has intervened into what is often thought of as a
binary and individualized employment relationship by becoming involved
in employer decision-making in areas not involving adverse employment
actions. 176
Programs such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act 177 and
Worker's Compensation 178 can be understood as recognizing employee
vulnerability and as reflecting a policy choice that mandated employers
179
share the costs of disruption in employment, at least to some extent.
These measures, which provided an income (continued means of resilience)
after dissolution of the employment relationship or in the case of injury
simultaneously acted to relieve or supplement the responsibility of the
newly responsible welfare state. These programs spread the costs of
responding to the economic risks associated with a modem economy
beyond the employee, who still risked unemployment, injury, or other
harms, to the employer who was to be part of the scheme to ensure some
continued resources for the employee.
Such systems do have real economic consequences for the employer as
well as positive ones for the employee. They demonstrate that at least in
some situations society recognizes that workers are too unevenly and
negatively affected by termination of employment. Importantly however,
workers' compensation and unemployment benefits are conceptually
designed in such a way as not to limit the employer's choice about
termination or undermine the idea of at-will employment. Rather, they

176.
177.
178.
179.

See
See
See
See

id
generally Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29.U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006).
Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
generally Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, OSHA ProposedRule,

14 EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE (Apr. 1999); MICHAEL B. SNYDER, COMPENSATION AND
BENEFITS 52 (Thomson Reuters 2013); ROGER HEROD, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES

GUIDE 17 (Thomson Reuters 2013).
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merely attach some consequences to exercising employer's choice in certain
circumstances in the interest of seeing the employee maintain some degree
of resilience.
If an employer chooses to put workers at risk of injury or fails to
provide adequate safeguards, it will be responsible for the employee's
medical bills if she is injured. If the employer chooses to terminate an
employee without just-cause, its payments to the unemployment system
may be affected.
These provisions for continued employee resilience are not
comprehensive or adequate, however.18 In some situations terminated or
injured employees must also resort to the state for supplemental resources,
which may only be provided in a stigmatized process. 18 ' And, as welcome
as is the imposition of this kind of cost sharing on employers, it is important
to realize that these schemes do not fundamentally alter the traditional
model of employer-employee relationship and are based only on a limited
principle of compensation in limited circumstances. Termination outside of
those circumstances typically carries no substantial shifting of the costs
from the employee to the employer.
However, despite the shortcomings of the existing provisions, the
history of state intervention into the employment relationship and the
concept of cost shifting are important. They suggest there is a productive
way to refocus employment law short of removing or substantially eroding
the at-will rule. 182 The focus can usefully turn to the question of equitable
allocation of costs and consequences of termination among the employee,
the employer, and the state. Just as vulnerability approach helps underscore
the need for social welfare legislation that provides a floor in terms of
access to assets or resources necessary for minimal resilience, it should also
help us to see what is involved in arguing for shifting of some costs now
borne by the employee to the employer. Before proceeding to that
argument, however, it is necessary to assess both the vulnerability of the
employer and its mechanisms of resilience.

180.

See generally Receiving Medicare and Disability Benefits, U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/155/-/receiving-medicare-

and-disability-benefits (last updated Jan. 2, 2013, 10:26 AM) (explaining the process of receiving
Medicare once becoming eligible for the program).
181. See The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 259.
182. Seeidat261-62.
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The Vulnerable Employer

As business and corporate structures, employers are also vulnerable to
harm, decline, and demise. They too must be understood as vulnerable and
as evoking state response.
1.

Harm - Employer Vulnerability Realized

The vulnerability of the employer is qualitatively different from that of
the employee. 183 In addition to the risks and rewards of the market and
threats from competitors, the employer must negotiate legal regulations
when they apply to its operations. Firms do go out of business or can be
taken over, but that sort of "demise" is not the same as the death of a human
individual and may, in fact, result in a more vigorous resurrected entity
through bankruptcy and reorganization.'" 4 Similarly, while loss of profits
resulting from natural or market disasters can hurt and weaken the employer
as an entity, those harms are economic rather than corporal , as the business
is an artificial legal construct, rather than an embodied living creature. As
such, the employer has a different set of concerns about and experiences
with vulnerability, which are largely economic and financial in nature.
Significantly, there are typically vast differences in the nature and quantity
of economic resources (resilience) that an employer can muster as
contrasted with the average employee when facing the risks and
opportunities
presented in volatile and uncertain markets or competitive
1 85
situations.
In some cases, the sources of employer and employee vulnerability are
in conflict with each other. For instance, the employer interest in
minimizing costs and improving necessities to guard itself against economic
sources of vulnerabilities can lead to deprivation of basic employees'
financial and physical safety, security, and health. As we have seen, in
those cases, the states' response has been to preserve employer flexibility or
choice, perhaps with a floor of minimum standards, and possibly shift some
costs to the employer. 86 While the employer can then been seen as
vulnerable to the law and legal measures protective of employees, if the
183. Institutional vulnerability of businesses is also different from the embodied vulnerability
of their managers, stockholders and executives as individuals, although economic and some other
forms of vulnerability, despite differences in magnitude, can be analogized across these
categories.
184. Human managers and owners are of course vulnerable as human beings, but here the
discussion is on the business entity, not the human individual.
185. Economic resources allow access to legal resources and can also provide access to
political power.
186. See Zev J. Eigen et al., Shifting the Paradigmof the Debate, IND. L.J. 271 (2012).
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employer terminates an employee, some economic and social costs to the
employee may not be remediable. An example would be the possible
stigma associated with being fired or the family relationships put under
pressure or damaged by financial hardship. That some employers under
current law may be found to have violated a specific exception, and thus
may suffer consequences by paying damages in the form of lost income and
costs of a job search, does not negate the fact that the focus of employment
law remains on preserving employer choice, intent,
and actions, not on the
187
consequences and costs suffered by the employee.
2.

Providing and Preserving Employer Resilience Through Law

Importantly, similar to its response to individual vulnerability, the law
has responded to some of the perceived vulnerability of employers by
providing mechanisms of resilience and risk mitigation. As in the case of
the social welfare provisions for individuals in perceived need, the
vulnerability of corporate or business institutions to start-up costs, operating
costs, or costs associated with maintaining on-going production schedules
are routinely evoked to justify subsidies,1 88 whether they take the form of
tax policies, 189 come in the form of direct transfers and investments, 19 0 or
are delivered through facilitating access to mechanisms of state authority,
such as law. 191 Additionally, it could be asserted that employment law has
generally responded to the needs of the vulnerable employer in regard to
unpredictable market conditions by shaping the nature of the employment
relationship in order to increase resilience of the employer without similar
regard for the resilience of employees.
Employment law generally allocates significant advantages and
privileges to employers, who gain or maintain significant resilience as a
187. See generally id. (arguing at-will employment should be eliminated and replaced with a
mandatory arbitration act).
188. See generally Corporate Subsidy Watch, GOOD JOBS FIRST, http://www.
goodjobsfirst.org/corporate-subsidy-watch (last visited Aug. 29, 2013) (providing a list of the

largest subsidies for US companies).
189. See Phillip Moeller, Top 10 Corporate Tax Breaks, MONEY RETIREMENT,
http://money.usnews.com/money/retirement/slideshows/top-10-corporate-tax-breaks
(last visited
Aug. 29, 2013).
190, See, e.g., Josh Max, US Auto Bailout Cost Rises to $25.1 Billion, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
(Aug. 15, 2012 1:39 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/autos/auto-bailout-cost-rises-25- l-billion3-4-billion-previously-estimated-article-1.1136798#ixzz2LuEaMjUl;
see generally Bailout
Recipients, PRO PUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last updated Aug. 27, 2013)
(tracking taxpayer money by creating a list of all bailout recipients).
191. For instance, because they are more sophisticated, corporations can take advantage of
protections granted to secured parties in debt repayment and bankruptcy proceedings. See U.C.C.
§ 9-501 (2010); Bankruptcy Act § 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006).
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group from those legal structures. 192 At-will employment, although it is
couched in neutral terms-providing freedom of contract for employees and
well as employers-in practice operates as the conferral of significant
advantage on the employer vis-A-vis the employee. The rule allocates the
costs and risks associated with uncertainties inherent in the labor market
disproportionately to the employee, providing flexibility for the employer at
the cost of insecurity for the employee.
One primary justification for the rule in today's employment world has
been need for flexibility that the at-will employment relationship provides,
which, it is argued, allows both parties to respond to changing conditions
and imperfect information in the market. 193
In addition, at-will
arrangements are said to facilitate hiring, thus also invigorating the labor
market and benefitting employees generally. This benefit results, it is
argued, because employers are more likely to hire instead of investing in
capital improvements when they know they can easily get rid of any
individual employees whenever they want to. 194 In this way, the at-will rule
fictitiously and erroneously creates the illusion of equivalence between the
employer and employee's uncertainty, which works in practice to confer
substantial benefits on employers. It also means that the substantial
economic and social costs of terminating the employment relationship fall
largely on the employee, who, if unable to bear them, will ultimately have
to turn to society's social welfare programs and safety nets.
Currently, employment law's response to the employment relationship
seems only equitable if we ignore both how employer vulnerability differs
from that of the employee in today's markets and how the resources the
employer can command (including law) place it in a far superior position
than the employee in regard to the ability to preserve and maintain its
unique form of resilience. The at-will rule invariably gives employers
flexibility to deal with changing conditions to address vulnerabilities arising
from the way we have structured the marketplace. By contrast employees
are not positioned by law to deal with their vulnerability and loss of
resilience without state intervention, which as we have seen, usually
happens only in response to crisis. 195

192. Employment law privileges business through whole areas of regulation. But for purposes
this paper, I only look at the at-will rule or more specifically what it represents in terms of
employer monopoly control over the workplace and conditions of employment.
193. See Epstein, supranote 25, at 982.
194. Id. at 975.
195.

See BILL OF RIGHTS INACTION, supra note 173.
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C. Benefits of Vulnerability Over the CurrentAt- Will Debate
As discussed above, our society inequitably distributes the costs of
economic uncertainty and loss of resilience in the employment relationship
to the employee, with the social safety net as his or her fragile backup. It is
time to rethink the way law confers privilege in defining this important
relationship, a task with significant public implications. The law should be
adjusted so there is a more equitable allocation of the costs currently placed
on individuals and society as a result of employer privilege, and more
balanced concern for the protection of resilience as between employer and
employee.
What I suggest we develop is not an all or nothing approach. I do not
argue for a wholesale rejection of the idealized autonomous private actor
model embodied in the at-will doctrine. Rather, I want to leave behind the
lost battle over the at-will rule, at least temporarily, and focus on the
privilege it confers on employers with respect to vulnerability and
resilience. Examining privilege and its justification will allow us to focus
on other inequitable and harmful aspects of the employment relationship, as
well as the costs of privilege. In thinking about the equities in employment
law, I am not advocating for a human rights model to be applied to labor
relations, 196 a strategy unlikely to succeed politically. A human rights
approach would require cutting back, even uprooting, on ideals of
that are foundational
individual choice and autonomy in decision-making
197
context.
political
American
principles the
However, conceding the strength of the at-will paradigm does not mean
that the way it is understood today is inevitable. Vulnerability theory offers
a way to think about workplace issues and the employment relationship less
antagonistically and more constructively than frontal attacks on the at-will
doctrine and the ideals of liberty and freedom of contract. It provides a
common framework that ties together all aspects of the employment
relationship and also allows us to bring in the interests of the society and
develop the concept of social or public responsibility in light of employee
vulnerability and need for resilience. In particular, a vulnerability approach
allows us to introduce the idea that the privilege the employer enjoys under

196. See James A. Gross, Workers Rights As Human Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479,
479-92 (2002); James A. Gross & Lance Compa, Human Rights in Labor and Employment
Relations, DIGITAL COMMONS @ ILR 1, 8 (Jan. 1, 2009), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051 &context-books.

197. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1747 (2012),
available at http://www.bu.edu/aw/central/jd/organizations/Journals/bulr/volume92n4/documents
/FINEMAN.pdf.
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the at-will regime might appropriately be accompanied by some reciprocal
responsibility for the situation of the employee.
As long as employer control of the workplace and ability to make
unilateral decisions in regard to employment remain givens required by the
overriding need for flexibility, any improvements in the workplace, whether
initiated by employer or structured by state, will be seen as generous or
gratuitous concessions to employees. Such voluntary concessions can be
revoked in times of economic downturn or in response to business necessity
as determined by the employer. However, if we view exclusive employer
control over both the decisions and the allocation of costs associated with
decisions not as natural and inevitable, but as the consequence of the power
conferred on the employer through the organization of the employment
relationship in employment law, then we can approach workplace
regulation in a different light.
This article cannot examine all the manifestations, affects, and
consequences that could arise as a result of applying vulnerability theory to
the employment relationship. That would require a wide variety of detailed
and extensive inquiries over time. However, the article can and does set the
stage for such further examinations of the employment relationship using
the vulnerability framework to outline the factors that should be weighed
and balanced in assessing privilege and disadvantage.
1.

Justifying Employer Privilege

As indicated earlier, the major rationales for employer control over the
employment relationship and the workplace are economic, i.e. based on the
need for flexibility and efficiency in light of myriad possibilities for change.
It has been argued that employers who are free to act unencumbered will be
able to maximize profits and remain competitive and that this happy result
will confer benefits on society in terms of jobs and prosperity.' 9 8 These
justifications resonate in American notions of capitalism and free market
ideology.
Revealing the potential severity of the individual and societal costs that
can follow from particular actions on the part of the employer raises the
question of whether this general justification for employer privilege can be
stretched to cover these specific manifestations of control. If some
employer actions (or inactions) cause unwarranted harm and confer
unnecessary costs on employees, they may also arguably be strongly
inconsistent with generally accepted societal norms. The first question to
ask in considering a specific practice or action is whether the action is in
198. See supra Part II.
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fact encompassed within and consistent with the justification for employer
privilege. Here, we should make a distinction between the privilege itself
and actions that are taken under protection of the privilege.
In some instances employer discretion should be subjected to political
and societal scrutiny and not left solely to employer discretion. Conceding
the general right of employers under the at-will model of employment to
generally control their enterprises does not mean that their control can or
should be absolute. There may be some particular exercises of employer
discretion that do not fall within the scope of the justification establishing
the blanket privilege. Some employer actions can result in substantial
harm.
For example, employers currently are not prohibited from
maintaining a coercive work environment, such as an environment that
might exist in a work culture that is tolerant, even accepting, of the bullying
or ridicule of some employees by others. If ridicule or bullying is done on
the basis of a prohibited category such as race or gender, an employee may
have recourse, but if it is not, there is no remedy for the employee.
Since the justifications for employer's control over the workplace
revolve around the need for freedom to make business decisions, there are
questions that should be asked about that justification. Does the business
necessity justification for employer control also justify a decision to allow
harassment in the workplace? Would removing the privilege of the
employer to maintain an abusive or coercive work environment negatively
affect its economic success or interfere with production? What are the costs
to employees if employer privilege in this area is not permitted? Are there
societal interests that are affected by allowing employers to maintain such a
workplace? The appropriate response to this particular type of employer
decision-making is perhaps the expansion of the existing exceptions to
employer control based on prohibited categories under Title VII "' to all
workers. Other situations falling outside of the rationale for employer
control might require the addition of a new exception to those already
providing vulnerable employees with protections.
2.

Allocating the Costs of Employer Privilege

Of course, most employer actions can and will be justified under the
terms of the business rationales for privileging employer control in the
employment relationship. But the inquiry should not stop there. We must
also consider the costs that result from the exercise of this privilege by the
employer, particularly the effect on the employee's vulnerability and
impaired resilience. One significant problem with the current focus on the
199.

See Civil Rights Act § 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e17 (2009).
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at-will rule is that there is little attempt to address the issue of allocation of
costs or consequences that flow from termination of the employment
relationship. Unless the termination is one of those rare instances where the
employer is found to have violated some clear exception, the costs are
allocated to the employee and whatever existing programs can help cushion
the blow. In other words, the focus on at-will has largely limited the debate
to the issue of the validity of the employer's decision, rather than the
consequences or costs of those choices. Understanding those costs and
their distribution and allocation may suggest that, in some circumstances,
the employer should share in the costs inherent in the exercise of their
privilege upon terminating an employee.
To recognize that the costs associated with termination are significant
and generally borne by the employee and the state (in terms of the cost to its
safety net) is not to suggest that the employer should be responsible for all
of the costs. Employers are also vulnerable, particularly economically, but
they should not be exempt from the costs of their actions for that reason
alone and be able to shift all the costs to the employee. In the same way,
because employers are also vulnerable, employees do not have the right to
demand that they keep their jobs in times of economic uncertainty, thereby
shifting all the costs of uncertainty onto the employer. We should not view
either employer or employee vulnerabilities as absolute determinants in
developing an equitable employment law. There will always be a need for a
balancing of interests and consideration of competing arguments around the
question of privilege. However, certainly one compelling reason for
placing at least some of the costs on the employer is the fact that it reaps
at-will
most of the potential benefits from the privilege conferred by the 200
control.
and
harm,
of
mitigation
planning,
flexibility,
of
terms
rule in
Some employer responsibility for the costs of termination has already
been legislated, as we have seen with programs such as Workers
Compensation. Perhaps other cost-sharing provisions could be added. The
vulnerable employee's need for flexibility in the face of economic
uncertainty could be addressed by requiring the employer to provide some
form of severance package that could include severance pay and continued
health insurance coverage for a period of time after termination. At a
minimum, employers should be required to provide sufficient notice of
intent to terminate and a paid waiting period so the employee has some
chance to mitigate the damages of termination. Employers could be made
200.

There are also costs to employer if employee leaves, but while the fact of the existence

of those costs may be thought of as equivalent in abstract to employee costs, those costs are
indeed not equal in nature or degree.

Employer's costs are qualitatively different, and the

employer is typically able to mitigate harm more quickly and easily than most employees.
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responsible for providing assistance to help the employee obtain another
position. It is well documented that opportunities in employment are
largely dependent on education and training. °1 In situations of termination,
further education or training could prove beneficial to the employee.
Assistance with job search and access to human resource personnel could
also be helpful.
Some of these services are provided voluntarily by some employers.
The state also has programs that help terminated employees.20 2 But
employment law is structured so that the default rule is that the employee
bears the costs of termination except in those limited situations where the
law mandates the employer assume some responsibility. That is the
inequitable allocation that must be remedied by an equitable distribution of
the risks and costs of economic uncertainty between the individual, the
state, and the employer.
VI. CONCLUSION

I argue here for a shift in focus, not necessarily a permanent
abandonment of the fight for just-cause employment. One day we might
see a change in the American legal system's fealty to principles of
individualism and free enterprise, or perhaps an embrace of the concept of
human rights in regard to economic and employment issues. Or there may
be some catastrophic event or political alignment of the stars that would set
the stage for a reconsideration of employment at-will. If that moment
arrives, employment law scholars should be prepared to seize it. In the
meantime, however, the struggle to abolish employment at-will is not
productive.
I believe that vulnerability theory and its application to employment
law warrants further exploration. Employer advocates have been very
successful in arguing against regulation. They point to free market
principles and economic arguments that resonate strongly with lawmakers,
judges, and the public. Employee advocates need a theoretical basis and a
vocabulary to support new rules (and hold on to old ones) that is consistent
and persuasive. The concepts of vulnerability, resilience, and the premise
that the state has an obligation to ensure a minimum level of resilience in
the face of vulnerability, may serve as a guiding principle to think about all
areas of employment law.

201.
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See The Responsive State, supra note 8, at 270.
See generally BILL OF RIGHTS INACTION, supra note 173.

